

# **Workplace Health and Safety Fatality Report**



**WORKER FATALLY INJURED  
WHEN PINNED BY TANK TRUCK PUP  
Date of Incident: March 11, 2007  
Type of Incident: Fatality**

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**Section 1.0 DATE AND TIME OF INCIDENT**

1.1 The incident took place on March 11, 2007 at approximately 10:30 p.m.

**Section 2.0 NAME & ADDRESS OF PRINCIPAL STAKEHOLDER(S)**

**2.1 Owner(s)**

2.1.1 Devon Canada Corporation  
2000, 400 – 3<sup>rd</sup> Avenue S.W.  
Calgary, Alberta  
T2P 4H2

**2.2 Prime Contractor**

2.2.1 Devon Canada Corporation  
2000, 400 – 3<sup>rd</sup> Avenue S.W.  
Calgary, Alberta  
T2P 4H2

**2.3 Contractors**

2.3.1 The Barlon Engineering Group Ltd.  
Suite 1110, 340 – 12<sup>th</sup> Avenue S.W.  
Calgary, Alberta  
T2R 1L5

2.3.2 Canadian Sands Incorporated  
132, 30 Richard Court S.W.  
Calgary, Alberta  
T3E 7N2

**2.4 Employer**

2.4.1 HSE Integrated Ltd.  
3500, 855 – 2<sup>nd</sup> Street S.W.  
Calgary, Alberta  
T2P 4J8

**2.5 Other Employers**

- 2.5.1 Schlumberger Canada Ltd.  
41 Floor 1<sup>st</sup> Canadian Place  
Toronto, Ontario  
M5X 1B2
- 2.5.2 Kjorlien Enterprises Ltd. (Trottier Trucking)  
4500, 855 – 2<sup>nd</sup> Street S.W.  
Calgary, Alberta  
T2P 4K7
- 2.5.3 Concord Well Servicing  
Box 1528, 3606 Highway Street  
Valleyview, Alberta  
T0H 3N0

**Section 3.0 DESCRIPTION OF PRINCIPAL STAKEHOLDER(S)**

- 3.1 Devon Canada Corporation is a wholly owned subsidiary of Devon Energy Corporation with headquarters located in Calgary, Alberta and oil and gas operations located throughout Canada. Devon Canada Corporation retained The Barlon Engineering Group Ltd. to provide wellsite supervision services and to direct and coordinate the activities of all the employers at the wellsite location.
- 3.2 The Barlon Engineering Group Ltd. is an oil and gas service provider based out of Calgary, Alberta. The Barlon Engineering Group Ltd. provides integrated project management and engineering services to the upstream oil and gas industry. The Barlon Engineering Group Ltd. was retained by Devon Canada Corporation to provide a wellsite supervisor at the wellsite location.
- 3.3 Canadian Sands Incorporated is an oil and gas service provider. Canadian Sands Incorporated was retained by The Barlon Engineering Group Ltd. to provide a wellsite supervisor at the wellsite location. The wellsite supervisor was co-ordinating the activities at the wellsite location.
- 3.4 HSE Integrated Ltd. is an industrial safety services company with operations in western, central and Atlantic Canada. HSE Integrated Ltd. also provides industrial medical services to the upstream oil and gas industry. HSE Integrated Ltd. was retained by Devon Canada Corporation to provide an Emergency Medical Technician (EMT) for medical standby services at the wellsite location.
- 3.5 Schlumberger Canada Ltd. is an oil and gas service provider. Schlumberger Canada Ltd. provides exploration and production services during the life of an oil and gas

reservoir including wireline logging activities. Schlumberger Canada Ltd. was retained by Devon Canada Corporation to provide wireline services to the wellbore.

3.6 Kjorlien Enterprises Ltd. (Trottier Trucking) is a trucking company which primarily operates tank trucks and vacuum trucks and provides fluid hauling services to the upstream oil and gas industry. Kjorlien Enterprises Ltd. was retained by Devon Canada Corporation to haul potassium chloride (KCl) fluid (3% salt/ water mixture) for the wellbore operations.

3.7 Concord Well Servicing is a division of CCS Income Trust. Concord Well Servicing operates 140 service rigs from 11 offices in Alberta, Saskatchewan, Northeast British Columbia and the Northwest Territories. Concord Well Servicing was retained by Devon Canada Corporation to provide well completion services.

#### **Section 4.0 LOCATION OF INCIDENT**

4.1 The incident occurred on a Devon Canada Corporation wellsite location at LSD 2-4-60-27W5M approximately 90 km southwest of Valleyview, Alberta.

#### **Section 5.0 EQUIPMENT AND MATERIAL INVOLVED**

##### **5.1 The Tank Truck and Tridem Stiff Pole Pup Trailer**

5.1.1 The tank truck and tridem stiff pole trailer (the pup trailer consists of 3 axles and a steel pole hitch which attaches to the tank truck) had been loaded with 25 m<sup>3</sup> of 3% KCl salt and water mixture. (Attachment B, Diagram 1)

##### **Tank Truck**

Make: 2004 Kenworth

Model: T800

VIN: 1NKDLBOX64R974390

Unit Number: 30

Length: 10.39 m

##### **Pup Trailer**

Make: 2003 Wabash

Model: Tridem Tank Trailer TC412

VIN: 2W9PF36353W040136

Unit Number: T3

Length: 9.02 m

##### **5.1.2 The Worksite**

The Devon Canada Corporation wellsite is located in the Municipal District of Greenview No.16. The Legal Land Description (LSD) is 2-4-60-27W5M. The wellsite consists of an area of 120 m x 120 m. Devon Canada Corporation retained a number of employers at the wellsite to conduct activities on the wellbore. Concord Well Servicing provided the service rig #24 to complete the well. Schlumberger Canada Ltd. provided a wireline truck and crew to run tools into the wellbore. HSE Integrated Ltd. provided a medic at the wellsite. Kjorlien Enterprises Ltd. was hired to haul fluid to the wellsite location for the upcoming fracturing job (pump fluid down the wellbore and crack the oil or gas bearing rock). On March 11, 2007 BJ Services had a tractor trailer (sand hog) unit spotted at the wellsite to prepare for the fracturing job which was scheduled for March 12, 2007.

### 5.1.3 **The Wireline Truck**

The wireline truck was backed up to the catwalk of the Concord Service Rig # 24. The wireline truck was utilized for perforating the wellbore. (Attachment A, Photograph 1).

Make: Foden

Model: OSLC

VIN: SFNSL00X41A451388

Unit Number: 2191

## **Section 6.0 NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION OF INCIDENT**

- 6.1 On March 10, 2007 at approximately 3:30 p.m. HSE Integrated Ltd's. Medic #1 arrived at the 2-4-60-27W5M worksite location. Medic #1 was sent to the location to relieve Medic #2 who was going on days off. A shift change meeting took place between the two medics. Medic #2 introduced Medic #1 to the Well Site Supervisor and to the Concord Well Servicing #24 rig crew.
- 6.2 On March 11, 2007 at approximately 7:30 a.m. the Schlumberger Canada Ltd. wireline crew rigged in their equipment. The Schlumberger Canada Ltd. wireline truck was backed up to the Concord Well Servicing Rig #24 Piperack/Catwalk on the west side of Concord Well Servicing's rig #24. (Attachment B, Diagram 1)
- 6.3 Medic #1's Mobile Treatment Centre (MTC) was parked at the lease entrance (Attachment B, Diagram 1). In addition to providing medical aid to workers injured on the wellsite location, Medic #1 was also responsible to sign workers in and out of the wellsite location and ensure that the workers coming onto the location had the Devon Canada Corporation safety orientation. These responsibilities were discussed between the Well Site Supervisor and Medic #1.
- 6.4 The Kjorlien Enterprises Ltd. Tank Truck Driver arrived at the wellsite location at approximately 9:30 p.m. in the Tank Truck and Tridem Stiff Pole Pup Trailer. The Tank Truck Driver spoke with Medic #1 at the lease entrance and was signed into the

wellsite location. The Wellsite Supervisor met the Tank Truck Driver at the entrance of the wellsite location and directed the Tank Truck Driver to off load the 25 m<sup>3</sup> of KCl water into the 400 barrel tank at the north end of the wellsite location. The Wellsite Supervisor also told the Tank Truck Driver that if he was backing up on the worksite, a spotter was required.

- 6.5 The Tank Truck Driver proceeded into the wellsite location, made an immediate left hand turn, drove forward and came to a stop near the 400 barrel tank. The Tank Truck Driver off loaded the 25 m<sup>3</sup> of KCl water into the 400 barrel tank and prepared to leave the wellsite location. (Attachment B, Diagram 1)
- 6.6 The Tank Truck Driver backed up without a spotter as far as he could which was approximately a truck length, stopped and walked around the back of his trailer to see the best place to back up (Attachment B, Diagram 1). As the Tank Truck Driver was walking back to his truck, Medic #1 approached him and asked if he needed any help. The Tank Truck Driver accepted Medic #1's offer of help and asked him to guide him back (act as the spotter) to ensure that he would not back into the rig guy wires and wireline truck.
- 6.7 Medic #1 positioned himself approximately 1.1 m away from the back left corner of the pup trailer. The Tank Truck Driver stated that he had full view of Medic #1 from his driver side mirror.
- 6.8 The Tank Truck Driver started to back up and turn the tank truck with the attached pup trailer to the passenger side (Attachment B, Diagram 1). The Tank Truck Driver continued until the pup trailer was in a jack-knifed position. As the Tank Truck Driver was backing up, he looked to the front of the tank truck to see if the front end of his truck was going to clear a filter system trailer and Medic #1's MTC which was parked at the lease entrance. (Attachment B, Diagram 1)
- 6.9 When the Tank Truck Driver looked back in his driver side mirror he could not see Medic #1. The Tank Truck Driver continued backing up while Medic #1 walked between the pup trailer and a stationary Schlumberger Canada Ltd. wireline truck. Medic #1 was pinned between the back corner bumper of the pup trailer and the driver's door of the stationary wireline truck. (Attachment A, Photograph 2)
- 6.10 While the Tank Truck Driver was backing up, a Schlumberger Canada Ltd. Wireline Operator was putting tools away at the back of the wireline truck. The Wireline Operator observed that the tank truck was going to hit the wireline truck so the Wireline Operator yelled for the Tank Truck Driver to stop. As the Wireline Operator yelled for the Tank Truck Driver to stop, the Tank Truck Driver had already started to pull ahead. When the Tank Truck Driver pulled ahead, the Wireline Operator saw Medic #1 lying on the ground. (Attachment B, Diagram 2)
- 6.11 The workers on the worksite started CPR on Medic #1. The Wellsite Supervisor called STARS and also contacted another Medic at a nearby camp. The workers

continued to provide first aid until Medic #1 was pronounced dead at the scene by the STARS Physician.

### **Section 6.13 INVESTIGATION INFORMATION AND OBSERVATIONS**

- 6.13.1 Workplace Health and Safety (WHS) Compliance Investigators arrived at the scene on March 12, 2007 and began an investigation into the circumstances surrounding the incident.
- 6.13.2 The Concord Well Servicing Rig #24 Rig Manager stated that congestion on the wellsite was a concern. The Rig Manager completed a hazard assessment form on March 11, 2007 which identified; a congested lease, the location of the wireline truck, limited room for moving. Spotting trucks was also identified as an action control on this hazard assessment. The Rig Manager reviewed this hazard assessment with his rig crew only.
- 6.13.3 The Workplace Health and Safety Compliance Investigators observed a sand hog trailer on the worksite. The trailer, which was on the worksite for an upcoming fracturing job, was parked in an area that blocked the ability of the Tank Truck Driver to drive forward around the worksite and drive straight out the lease entrance. (Attachment A, Photograph 3) On past occasions when the sand hog trailer was not parked in this area truck drivers were able to drive forward, around the wellsite location, and proceed straight out the lease entrance.
- 6.13.4 At the time of the incident (March 11, 2007 at 10:30 p.m.) it was dark and raining. The lease conditions were muddy. At the time of the investigation (next day, March 12, 2007) the Workplace Health and Safety Compliance Investigators observed three light towers on the worksite location and in working order. Medic #1 was wearing HSE Integrated Ltd. coveralls which had high visibility reflective striping on them.
- 6.13.5 At the time of the site investigation the Workplace Health and Safety Compliance Investigators observed the Kjorlien Enterprises Ltd. tank truck back up alarm was functioning and the exterior flood lights on the tank truck and pup trailer were in working order.
- 6.13.6 The Wellsite Supervisor stated to Workplace Health and Safety Compliance Investigators that he indicated to the Tank Truck Driver that a spotter was required when he was backing up. The Wellsite Supervisor did not designate a spotter for the Tank Truck Driver to use.
- 6.13.7 The Rig Manager indicated that in the past, a member of the rig crew would act as a spotter for trucks coming onto location. The Tank Truck Driver did not know who to use as a spotter on this worksite. The Workplace Health and Safety Compliance Investigators determined that there was no system in place to identify who to use as a spotter when trucks were required to back up on the worksite.

- 6.13.8 The Kjorlien Enterprises Ltd. General Manager stated that he told their tank truck drivers to pick someone on a worksite when a spotter was required. There was no method or system in place to ensure a spotter was competent or to ensure proper communication was being used.
- 6.13.9 It was Devon Canada Corporation's procedure to ensure all employers and workers on their worksite receive the Devon Canada Corporation's Health, Safety and Environment Safety Orientation (Second Edition); however, Devon Canada Corporation was unable to provide any record demonstrating that the Tank Truck Driver had received this safety orientation for the worksite and the Tank Truck Driver could not recall if he had received the safety orientation.
- 6.13.10 Kjorlien Enterprises Ltd. had a vehicle backup procedure which referenced the use of a guide (spotter); however, the procedure did not include a method to determine the competence of a spotter or a communication system to be used with a spotter.
- 6.13.11 Kjorlien Enterprises Ltd. had a hazard assessment checklist on their truck ticket. The hazard assessment did identify congestion as a hazard but there were no controls identified to reduce or eliminate the congestion hazard.
- 6.13.12 HSE Integrated Ltd. could not demonstrate that Medic #1 had training to act as a spotter. The HSE Integrated Ltd's. Medical Safety Technician Job Description stated that medics provide safety support to client representatives including any reasonable requests outside normal duties.

## **Section 7.0 ANALYSIS**

### **7.1 Direct Cause**

The Tank Truck Driver lost sight of Medic #1 and continued backing up resulting in Medic #1 being pinned between the pup trailer and the stationary wireline truck which caused fatal injuries.

### **7.2 Contributing Factors**

- 7.2.1 The Tank Truck Driver lost sight of Medic #1. The Tank Truck Driver continued to back up. It is unknown why Medic #1 walked between the pup trailer and the stationary wireline truck.
- 7.2.2 The Wellsite Supervisor did not designate a spotter or identify to the Tank Truck Driver who to use as a spotter. The Wellsite Supervisor stated a worker from the rig crew would act as a spotter however there was no system in place to ensure a competent rig worker acted as a spotter at all times.
- 7.2.3 The Tank Truck Driver directed Medic #1 to act as the spotter. The Tank Truck

Driver and Medic #1 discussed an agreed hand signal for stopping, however there was no other communication procedure discussed.

- 7.2.4 Concord Well Servicing identified the specific hazards on the worksite which included backing up on the worksite and completed a written hazard assessment. The Wellsite Supervisor did not ensure the Concord Well Servicing hazard assessment was reviewed with all workers on the worksite. Each employer on the worksite completed their own hazard assessment.
- 7.2.5 The Tank Truck Driver had a valid Class 1 driver's license. The Tank Truck Driver had attended the Kjorlien Enterprises Ltd's. Tank Truck Training which included practical operation of the tank truck. The Tank Truck Driver had been provided a copy and had signed acknowledgments of the Kjorlien Enterprises Ltd. safety orientation, driver manual (which included a backup procedure with a spotter) and safety manual.

## **Section 8.0 APPLICABLE LEGISLATION**

### **8.1 Occupational Health and Safety Act, Section 3(3), Prime Contractor**

- 8.1.1 Devon Canada Corporation, as the prime contractor with respect to the worksite, did not ensure as far as reasonably practicable to do so that the Occupational Health and Safety Act, regulations and adopted code were complied with. The employers and their workers who were retained by Devon Canada Corporation were in non-compliance with the Occupational Health and Safety Act, regulations and adopted code by operating powered mobile equipment in an unsafe manner, by allowing a worker to spot vehicles on the worksite who had no formal spotter training and not ensuring a hazard assessment for spotting tank trucks was completed before the work began.

### **8.2 Occupational Health and Safety Act, Section 2(1)(a)(ii) Obligations of Employers**

- 8.2.1 Kjorlien Enterprises Ltd. did not ensure as far as it was reasonably practicable for the employer to do so the health and safety of Medic #1 who was not a Kjorlien Enterprises Ltd. worker but was present at the work site and assisting the Tank Truck Driver. There was no hazard assessment for the task of backing up a tank truck with a pup trailer on the worksite.

### **8.3 Occupational Health and Safety Act, Section 2(2)(a) Obligations of Workers**

- 8.3.1 The Tank Truck Driver did not take reasonable care to protect the health and safety of Medic #1. When the Tank Truck Driver lost sight of Medic #1 who was guiding

the tank truck backwards, the Tank Truck Driver continued driving the tank truck back without knowing where Medic #1 was positioned.

- 8.3.2 Medic #1 did not take reasonable care to protect his own health and safety. He placed himself in a hazardous position without communicating to the Tank Truck Driver that he had left his original position where the Tank Truck Driver had view of him.

- 8.4 **Occupational Health and Safety Regulation, Section 13(1)(a)**  
**General - General Protection of Workers**

- 8.4.1 HSE Integrated Ltd. did not ensure that the HSE Integrated Ltd's. worker was competent in the task of guiding (spotting) vehicles. The HSE Integrated Ltd. worker conducted the task of guiding (spotting) a tank truck with attached pup trailer and placed himself in danger. The task of guiding (spotting) the tank truck was not specifically part of the HSE Integrated Ltd. workers job responsibilities but the HSE Integrated Ltd. Procedures and Technical Manual specified that medics could provide safety support to client representatives including any reasonable requests outside normal duties. When the Tank Truck Driver asked for assistance Medic #1 agreed to help him.

- 8.5 **Occupational Health and Safety Code, Section 7(2)**  
**Hazard Assessment, Elimination and Control**

- 8.5.1 Kjorlien Enterprises Ltd. had a checklist of hazards identified on their Bill of Lading Ticket, which included congested work. The Tank Truck Driver identified congestion as a hazard on this worksite but there were no controls documented on his hazard assessment. The Tank Truck Driver did attempt touse a spotter to control the hazard of backing up on this congested worksite.

- 8.6 **Occupational Health and Safety Code, Section 256(3)(b)**  
**Operator Responsibilities**

- 8.6.1 The Tank Truck Driver did not operate the tank truck with pup trailer in a safe manner. After losing sight of his spotter, the Tank Truck Driver continued to back up the tank truck with pup trailer not knowing where his spotter was.

- 8.7 **Occupational Health and Safety Code, Section 258(1)(b)**  
**Powered Mobile Equipment – Dangerous Movement**

- 8.7.1 The Kjorlien Enterprises Ltd. Tank Truck Driver lost visual sight of Medic #1. The Tank Truck Driver continued to back up the tank truck with pup trailer not knowing the position of Medic #1. This exposed Medic #1 to the danger of the moving tank truck.

8.8 **Occupational Health and Safety Code, Section 258(2)  
Powered Mobile Equipment – Dangerous Movement**

8.8.1 The movement of the tank truck with pup trailer created a danger to Medic #1. Medic #1 allowed himself to remain within range of the tank truck with pup trailer.

**Section 9.0 FOLLOW-UP / ACTION TAKEN**

9.1 **Alberta Employment, Immigration & Industry**

9.1.1 Workplace Health and Safety Compliance Investigators issued an order to Devon Canada Corporation as the prime contractor to conduct an investigation into the circumstances surrounding the incident.

9.1.2 Workplace Health and Safety Compliance Investigators issued orders to Kjorlien Enterprises Ltd. regarding powered mobile equipment dangerous movement, vehicle traffic control and hazard assessment.

9.1.3 Workplace Health and Safety Compliance Investigators issued orders to HSE Integrated Ltd. regarding general protection of workers.

9.2 **Industry**

9.2.1 Devon Canada Corporation complied with the order written. Devon Canada Corporation conducted an investigation into the circumstances surrounding the incident. Devon Canada Corporation has amended its safety orientation handbook with respect to movement of powered mobile equipment on its worksites and has developed a trucker checklist which addresses backing up with a competent spotter. Devon Canada Corporation assisted Kjorlien Enterprises Ltd. with the development of an industry safety alert.

9.2.2 Kjorlien Enterprises Ltd. complied with the orders written. Kjorlien Enterprises Ltd. completed a revision of its Vehicle Back Up Policy and Procedure, developed a Vehicle Back Up Safe Work Practice and an in-house Vehicle Back Up training program which follows the Canadian Association of Oilwell Drilling Contractors (CAODC) Industry Recommended Practice (IRP) #12 (Hand Signals for Directing Vehicles). Kjorlien Enterprises Ltd. has also revised its hazard assessment form and has included a section to list its controls to hazards identified.

9.2.3 HSE Integrated Ltd. has revised the Job Duties, Responsibilities and Stand By procedures for medics. HSE Integrated Ltd. has revised their Truck Safe Operating Program Manual and Skills Checklist. HSE Integrated Ltd. has revised their Critical Hazard Assessment worksheets. HSE Integrated Ltd. developed a Mobile

Equipment Guiding Procedure which follows the CAODC Industry Recommended Practice (IRP) #12. HSE Integrated Ltd. developed this procedure and made revisions to the above with respect to guiding their own HSE Integrated Ltd. powered mobile equipment. HSE Integrated Ltd. will not allow their workers to guide any other employer's powered mobile equipment. HSE Integrated Ltd. has demonstrated this by developing and implementing a Consequences and Penalties for Non-Compliance form which their workers must sign.

9.3 **Additional Measures**

9.3.1 There were no additional measures.

**Section 10.0 SIGNATURES**

Original Report Signed  
Investigator

\_\_\_\_\_  
Date

Original Report Signed  
Investigator

\_\_\_\_\_  
Date

Original Report Signed  
Manager

\_\_\_\_\_  
Date

Original Report Signed  
Senior  
Manager, North

\_\_\_\_\_  
Date

**Section 11.0 ATTACHMENTS**

Attachment A Photographs  
Attachment B Diagram



Photograph #1

The yellow arrow shows the tank truck and tridem stiff pole pup trailer and also shows the final position of the tank truck after the tank truck driver struck the medic and pulled forward. The red arrow shows the wireline truck where the medic was pinned by the right hand side of the back pup trailer's bumper.



Photograph #2

Shows where the medic was pinned between the pup trailer and stationary wireline truck. The yellow arrow shows the bent exterior flood light and steel frame on the rear bumper of the pup trailer. The blue arrow shows the damage to the driver's door of the wireline truck. The red star shows the approximate location where the wireline operator found the medic lying on the ground.



Photograph #3

Shows the area where the tank truck was backing out. The white arrow shows the direction the tank truck was backing out from after unloading the 25 m<sup>3</sup> KCl water . The red arrow shows the sand hog trailer that was blocking the path that drivers usually took to drive straight out of the location.